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Hybrid Advertising Auctions 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Several major websites offer hybrid auctions that allow advertisers to bid on a per-impression or 
a per-click basis. We present the first analysis of this hybrid advertising auction setting. The 
conventional wisdom is that brand advertisers (e.g. Coca-Cola) will bid per impression, while 
direct response advertisers (e.g. Amazon.com) will bid per click. We analyze a theoretical model 
of advertiser bidding to ask whether this conventional wisdom will hold up in practice. We find 
the opposite in a static game: brand advertisers bid per click, while direct response advertisers 
bid per impression. In a more realistic repeated game, we find that direct response advertisers bid 
per click, but brand advertisers may profitably alternate between bidding for clicks and bidding 
for impressions. The analysis implies that sellers of online advertising (a) may sometimes prefer 
not to offer advertisers multiple bidding options, (b) should try to ascertain advertisers’ types 
when they do use hybrid auctions, and (c) should consider advertisers’ strategic incentives when 
forming click-through rate expectations in hybrid auction formats. 
 
Keywords: Advertising, Auctions, Internet Marketing, Search Advertising. 
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Auctions are the dominant sales mechanism to allocate online advertising space. One commonly 
used auction is the cost per thousand impressions (CPM) auction in which advertisers bid for 
impressions and make payments each time their ad is displayed on a webpage. A second 
commonly used auction is the cost per click (CPC) auction in which advertisers bid for clicks 
and pay only when their ad is clicked.  
 CPM ad pricing has traditionally been associated with “brand advertisers” who are 
primarily interested in purchasing advertising exposures. Brand advertisers (e.g., Coca-Cola or 
Ford) often advertise with the intention of influencing consumers’ product perceptions, for 
example creating awareness or reinforcing a brand image. They expect this strategy to influence 
purchase decisions made in offline environments such as retail stores. CPM pricing has been the 
standard ad price metric in traditional advertising media (e.g., television, newspapers, billboards) 
for decades, and CPM pricing continues to be standard in online display advertising (Evans 
2008).  
 CPC pricing, by contrast, is relatively new. It was invented by GoTo.com in 1998, in a 
successful effort to lure advertisers from rival websites (Battelle 200t). It has since been adopted 
as the standard pricing metric in the search advertising industry. CPC pricing is especially 
attractive to “direct response advertisers,” for whom clicks are the primary concern. Such firms 
(e.g., Amazon.com or eBay.com) typically sell products online, and their ads are designed to 
trigger online sales in the short run. Since these advertisers can usually track consumer 
profitability at a fine level of granularity, they prefer the CPC model
1
, as it allows them to 
compare their marginal profits and advertising cost at the level of the individual click. 
 In principle, it is not clear that any online advertising space should be allocated 
exclusively via a CPC or a CPM auction model. Several new and high-profile sellers of internet 
advertising offer the hybrid advertising auction. Google offers it on its content network, which it 
describes by saying  
 
“The Google content network reaches 80% of global internet users -- making it the world's #1 ad 
network. Thousands of advertisers use Google to reach users on hundreds of thousands of web sites 
across all industries, from large, well-known sites to niche sites and audiences. [It has] an audience 
larger than any other ad network or single web property (even Google.com)…” 2 
                                                     
1
 http://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=54411&cbid=-1n7xvy51ltxfj&src=cb&lev=answer. 
Accessed March 2009. 
2
 http://www.google.com/adwords/contentnetwork. Accessed March 2009. 
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Advertisers may choose whether to use CPC bidding, in which they pay per click, or CPM 
bidding, in which they pay per impression. Bids of both types compete in a hybrid auction for the 
same advertising space.  
 Facebook.com is another major seller of internet advertising space. It reached 108 million 
unique individuals in December 2008, who, cumulatively, used the site for 20.5 billion minutes, 
up 566% from December 2007 (Nielsen 2009). Facebook advertisers have a prominent option to 
bid for ad space on the site using either a CPC bid or a CPM bid.  
 The hybrid auction raises several interesting questions. Does the choice of bid type matter 
when determining the auction outcome and auction seller revenues? Under what conditions 
should an advertiser enter a CPC bid or a CPM bid? The conventional wisdom motivating the 
hybrid auction format is that brand advertisers prefer CPM bidding while direct response 
advertisers prefer CPC bidding (c.f. Figure 3 below). Does this conventional wisdom obtain in 
equilibrium?  
 We are partially motivated to study this hybrid auction market by some related intuition. 
Advertisers may influence the number of clicks their ads receive by strategically choosing their 
ad text. As a very simple example, they can choose to encourage consumers to “click here.” 
Another possible strategy is to include a “hard sell” in their ad, which might be effective in 
shaping offline behavior but might discourage the consumer from clicking the ad. A third option 
is to alter the frequency with which new ads are introduced, which in turn influences the 
likelihood of consumer clicks. Under some conditions, brand advertisers may enter CPC bids 
while choosing their click-through rates (CTR)
3
 to be artificially low. This strategy might be 
profitable if it lowers advertising costs.  
We answer these questions by analyzing a theoretical model of a hybrid advertising 
auction. We consider a scenario in which a brand advertiser competes with a direct response 
advertiser for a set of ads sold by a seller of online advertising (which we refer to as the 
“website”). Each advertiser chooses a bid type (CPC or CPM) and a bid amount. Advertisers 
may also choose their click-through rates from within a range of feasible values. We show that in 
a one-shot game, the conventional wisdom is reversed: brand advertisers optimally enter CPC 
bids and direct response advertisers use CPM bidding (we refer to this result as “bidding against 
                                                     
3
 The click-through rate is the number of times an ad is clicked divided by the number of times the ad is shown.  
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type” or “bid reversals”). We then analyze a repeated game, and find that direct response 
advertisers always use CPC bidding, while brand advertisers may profitably alternate between 
CPM bids and CPC bids.  
In the next section, we describe both some features of the industry, and empirical 
evidence that motivate our analysis and assumptions. We also review the academic literature to 
which we contribute. Section 2 presents a static model of a hybrid advertising auction, and 
section 3 shows that bidding against type persists in a repeated game as well. Section 4 contains 
a nontechnical discussion of the managerial implications of our results.  Section 5 concludes with 
some limitations and directions for future research. Proofs of all lemmas and propositions are 
confined to the Appendix.  
 
1. Industry Background and Relevant Literature 
While hybrid advertising pricing systems have been used online for more than 10 years, they 
have received no prior academic study. They were very popular in the early days of internet 
advertising, but their use has been largely supplanted by pure CPC pricing systems. Hybrid 
pricing models fell from 48% of advertising revenues in 1998 to 4% in 2008, while performance-
based pricing (including CPC pricing) increased from 4% to 47% in the same time period. 
Impression-based pricing fell slightly from 49% in 1998 to 45% in 2008 (IAB 2000, 2009).
4
  
 Despite the decrease in hybrid pricing models’ use, they are still offered by sophisticated 
and new websites that sell advertising. Most early hybrid pricing models were not hybrid 
auctions, as are being used today. Google allows advertisers to use either CPM or CPC bidding 
when buying ads on its content network, but not on its organic search results. Figure 1 shows the 
Google help page that describes competition between CPM and CPC bids, making clear that 
neither type of bid receives priority placement.  
 Facebook also offers the choice of CPM or CPC bidding. Figure 2 illustrates that the 
choice to select bid type is quite prominent in the automated self-service process required to set 
up an advertisement. Facebook’s help file, shown in Figure 3, reinforces the conventional 
wisdom regarding the appropriateness of CPM bidding for brand advertisers and CPC bidding 
for direct response advertisers. It states:  
 
                                                     
4
 Due to high internet advertising growth rates, the total amount of advertising dollars sold via hybrid pricing models 
declined just 14%, from $990 million to $850 million. 
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Figure 1. Google Help Page on CPC/CPM Bid competition 
 
 
Figure 2. Step 3 of 3 in Facebook’s “Create an Ad” Process 
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Figure 3. Facebook CPC/CPM Help Answers 
 
 
“As a CPC advertiser you are indicating that what is most important to you is having people click through to your 
website and controlling the actual cost to drive each individual person to your site. As a CPM advertiser you are 
indicating that it is more important to you that many people see your ad, not that they actually take action after 
seeing your ad. CPM advertising is usually more effective for advertisers who want to raise awareness of their brand 
or company, while CPC advertising is more effective for advertisers who are hoping for a certain response from 
users (like sales or registrations).”  
 
While Facebook and Google offer hybrid advertising auctions, other major sellers of advertising 
such as Yahoo! and MySpace did not offer CPM bidding at the time of writing. In addition, 
Google did not offer CPM bidding on advertising placed next to its organic search results. As 
these choices may have strategic consequences, our analysis will shed some light on the pros and 
cons of offering multiple bid types.  
 A critical assumption, which has substantial empirical support, in our analysis is that 
advertisers may influence the click-through rates their ads receive. The primary factors 
determining click-through rate appear to be ad content, ad familiarity, and user factors. 
Robinson, Wysocka and Hand (2007) found that increasing the number of words in a banner ad 
from less than 6 to more than 15, holding other factors constant, can increase the click-through 
8 
 
rate by more than 100%.  Mand (1998) finds that interactivity has a substantial effect on banner 
ad click-through rates. In addition to academic work, sellers of online advertising, such as 
Google and Facebook, offer numerous tips regarding how to design online ads to maximize 
click-through rates. They also offer tools that allow advertisers to experiment with a variety of 
different ads to see which ones generate the highest click-through rates. The advertiser who 
wants to maximize (or minimize) click-through rates could presumably choose to employ (or 
deliberately ignore) strategies from a wide range of studies and seller-generated tools.  
 Could an online advertisement that generates a low click-through rate be profitable to a 
brand advertiser? Several studies support the idea that online advertisements with low click-
through rates are still effective in building brands. Dréze and Husherr (2003) show that despite 
high rates of “ad-blindness” (consumers’ tendency to avoid focusing on the parts of webpages 
where ads appear), consumers exposed to banner ads exhibit higher rates of aided and unaided 
brand recall, regardless of whether they clicked the ads or not. Danaher and Mullarkey (2003) 
demonstrate that time spent viewing a webpage increased the likelihood a consumer would recall 
a brand whose banner ad appeared on that webpage. 
 Our primary contribution is to make a first statement about equilibrium strategies in 
hybrid advertising auctions. Our analysis differs from previous papers’ in several key 
assumptions. This is the first paper to consider advertiser competition in type of bid as well as 
bid level. We do so under the realistic assumption of private information about advertisers’ types 
and profits, whereas most of the literature assumes perfect information. We are not aware of any 
previous paper that allows for multiple types of advertisers, or accounts for the possibility that 
advertisers may strategically influence their click through rates. Our analysis is general relative 
to the bulk of the literature in that we do not limit the number of bidders or ad slots, and we 
allow for repeated interactions. 
While we focus on hybrid auctions with CPC bidding and CPM bidding, a third bid type 
is the cost per action (CPA) model in which advertisers pay per purchase or lead. CPA bidding is 
used less frequently than CPC or CPM bidding (Nazerzadeh, Saberi, and Vohra 2008). Our 
analysis below can be reinterpreted as a CPM/CPA hybrid auction if we assume that advertisers 
are choosing their conversion rate rather than their click-through rate.  
 Our paper adds to a quickly growing literature on search advertising auctions. The 
pioneering treatments on equilibria in such auctions are Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz 
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(2007) and Varian (2007), which independently studied aspects of the auction mechanisms used 
by Google and Yahoo (known as the “Generalized Second Price” auction, or “GSP”). They 
found that, in general, the GSP does not have a dominant bidding strategy, but under intuitive 
refinements, advertisers with higher expected valuations per click occupy higher ad positions in 
equilibrium. Athey and Ellison (2008) and Chen and He (2006) study how advertisers’ bids are 
affected by interadvertiser competition. Recent analytical work has examined how to incorporate 
searcher and keyword characteristics into the advertising auction (Even-Dal, Kearns and 
Wortman, 2008); how CPC advertising auctions affect advertising’s quality-signaling function 
(Feng and Xie 2007); the interplay between organic and sponsored search links and the website’s 
optimal choice of paid links (Katona and Sarvary 2008); how to modify the position auction to 
account for externalities between advertisers at different positions (Kempe and Mahdian 2007); 
and the effects of “click fraud” on search engine revenues (Wilbur and Zhu 2009), among other 
topics.  
 There is also a rapidly expanding collection of empirical studies of search advertising 
markets. Ghose and Yang (2009) find that click-through and conversion rates decrease with ad 
position and that search engines account for both current bid price, and prior click-through rates 
when allocating advertisements to ad slots. Goldfarb and Tucker (2007) find that pricing search 
advertisements separately across different keywords allows search engines to price discriminate 
among advertisers. Rutz and Bucklin (2007a) show how to borrow information across a large 
number of keywords in order to solve the optimal keyword selection and bidding problem. Rutz 
and Bucklin (2007b) show that while generic keywords (e.g. “hotel los angeles”) are often very 
expensive, they have spillover effects, as consumers tend to begin shopping with a generic search 
and later use a branded search to purchase. Yao and Mela (2009) use a structural dynamic 
Bayesian model to analyze data from a search engine. Among many other findings, their study 
reports that frequent clickers place a greater emphasis on the position of the sponsored 
advertising link and that a switch from a first-price to a second-price auction yields advertiser 
bids that are in line with willingness to pay, but this switch has a small impact on search engine 
revenue. 
 
2. Equilibrium Analysis in a Static Auction 
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We consider a set of i=1…N risk-neutral advertisers bidding for NKk ...1  ads offered by a 
website. The website allows advertisers to choose a CPC bid cb  or a CPM bid 
mb . We normalize 
the measure of available consumer exposures to 1. We assume that there are two types of 
advertisers: brand advertisers (“B”) and direct response advertisers (“D”). Type B’s payoff 
depends on impressions while type D’s depends on clicks. Type B advertisers’ profit per 
exposure is ),0(Bir . Type D advertisers’ profit per click is ),0(Dir .  Advertisers’ 
valuations are private information. Each advertiser can choose a click-through rate ],[ .5 
 Following Katona and Sarvary (2008), we assume that an ad appearing in slot k has a 
position-dependent click-through multiplier 
kX  with KXXX ...21 . To capture the position 
effect on brand advertisers’ valuation, we define position dependent exposure multipliers 
KYYY 21 . This allows an ad’s position on the page to determine the likelihood it is seen.  
 The game is played in two stages. In the first stage, all advertisers simultaneously choose 
their bid types and their bid amounts. In the second stage, the auction mechanism (described 
below) allocates advertisers to ad slots, and then the K advertisers allocated to ad slots 
simultaneously choose click-through rates. The website anticipates each advertiser i’s choice of 
click through rate; we label this anticipated click-through rate 
E
i . 
 
2.1. The Auction Mechanism  
Our goal is to analyze equilibrium bidding strategies in hybrid advertising auctions. However, 
these auctions have not been studied before, the websites that offer them (e.g. Facebook, Google) 
typically do not reveal the precise auction mechanisms, and these websites may differ in the 
hybrid auction mechanisms they use. Websites’ lack of transparency about their auction 
mechanisms is a strong argument to study these auctions, as it creates uncertainty among 
advertisers as to what bidding strategies may be optimal. However, it requires us to make some 
assumptions about how the auction assigns advertisers to slots based on their bids.  
 
Assumption 1. The website assigns advertisers to slots in order of total expected advertiser 
willingness to pay.  
 
                                                     
5
 We assume the range of feasible click-through rates are identical for both types of advertiser for simplicity, but our 
results can be extended to a case in which the range of feasible click-through rates depends on advertiser type.  
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If advertisers were charged their bids, a CPM bid mib  would represent advertiser i’s total 
payment for a slot. If i instead entered a CPC bid cib , its total expected payment for slot k would 
be ci
E
ik bX .  Assumption 1 implies that if advertiser i enters a CPM bid and advertiser j enters a 
CPC bid, i will be allocated to slot k and j to a less desirable slot if ci
E
ik
m
i bXb . It is 
straightforward to show that an auction mechanism which produced a ranking in which this 
inequality did not hold would produce weakly lower revenue that the mechanism we assume 
here. This assumption is consistent with Google’s statement in Figure 1 that “neither type of ad 
[CPC or CPM] has a special advantage over the other.” It is also consistent with Facebook’s 
statement in Figure 3 that “for any available ad inventory, Facebook selects the best ad to run 
based on the cost per click or impression and the ad performance.” In addition, if the website 
used any other ranking method, it would systematically bias advertisers toward using one type of 
bid over the other. 
 
Assumption 2. Each advertiser is charged the minimum amount necessary to keep its place in the 
ranking.  
 
Assumption 2 is in line with the prior literature on CPC auctions (e.g. Edelman et al. 2007, 
Varian 2007) and the common understanding of Google’s pure-CPC keyword auction.6 Search 
engines typically use variants of second-price auctions in order to reduce the advertisers’ 
incentive to bid beneath their reservation values. As Google states in Figure 1, “No matter which 
type of ad [CPC or CPM] wins the position, the Adwords discounter monitors the competition 
and ensures that the winning ad is charged only what is necessary to maintain its ranking above 
the next-highest ad.”  
 Assume that advertiser i holds position k and advertiser j holds position k+1. Let j
g
jb  be a 
bid of type },{ mcg j  entered by advertiser j. If both advertisers entered CPM bids, then i pays 
m
jb . If both advertisers entered CPC bids, then i pays E
i
c
j
E
j b  per click. If advertiser i entered a 
                                                     
6
 We follow previous literature in assuming expected click-through rates enter the auction mechanism, rather than 
the “quality scores” described in Google’s help files. Another way to interpret our results is to assume that  
represents the advertiser’s quality score rather than its click-through rate.  
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CPC bid and j entered a CPM bid, then i pays 
E
ik
m
j
X
b
 per click. If i entered a CPM bid and j 
entered a CPC bid, then i pays c
jk
E
jk bX 1 .  
 It is notationally convenient to represent the CPM bid or the converted CPC bid of the 
advertiser in slot k+1 as  
bid. CPM a submits 1slot gets  whoadvertiser  theif ,
bid. CPC a submits 1slot gets  whoadvertiser  theif ,
1
11
 kb
 kbX
C
m
k
c
k
E
kk
k
 
 A direct response advertiser i who wins ad slot k with a CPC bid has profits  
                                            kE
i
i
Diik
c
ik CrX ,                    (1) 
and when it wins the slot with a CPM bid, it gets  
                                                            kDiik
m
ik CrX . (2) 
The profit function of a brand advertiser i who wins ad slot k with a CPC bid is  
                                                        
kE
i
i
Bik
c
ik CrY , (3) 
and when it wins the slot with a CPM bid, it gets  
                                                                      kBik
m
ik CrY . (4)   
Let 
                                                    
cg
mg
i
i
g i
 if 
 if 1
E
i
i
 (5)
 
so advertiser i's total costs in position k are k
g
i C
i . If we define ikR  as total revenues according 
to advertiser type and position, profit can be written as k
g
ik
g
ik CR
i
i
i . Finally, we define N-
vectors 
Niigg ,...,1)( , Ni
g
i
ibb ,...,1)( , Ni
E
i
E
,...,1)( , and Nii ,...,1)( . 
 
2.2. Advertisers’ Choice of Click-Through Rates  
We solve the game recursively, beginning with advertisers’ optimal click-through rates in the 
second stage of the game.  
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Lemma 1. If a direct response advertiser gets an ad slot in the static game, its weakly dominant 
strategy is to choose .  
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Lemma 2. If a brand advertiser gets an ad slot in the static game, its weakly dominant strategy is 
to choose . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
We assume that the website’s expectations about click-through rates in the first stage are in 
alignment with Lemmas 1 and 2. 
 
2.3. Equilibrium Bidding Strategies 
We begin by formalizing our notion of equilibrium. In sections 2.4 and 2.5, we characterize 
advertisers’ choice of bid types under two competing assumptions about website information. 
Definition 1 formalizes our equilibrium concept.  
 
Definition 1:  Given E , a vector of bids b and an ordering of advertisers constitute a Nash 
Equilibrium if the following conditions hold: 
1. for every advertiser i in slot }...1{ Kk , for every alternative position }...1{' Kk  and 
alternate bid type 'ig , },,,{MAX
''
''
iiiii g
ik
g
ik
g
ik
g
ik
g
ik , 
2. for every advertiser i in slot }...1{ Kk , 0i
g
ik , and 
3. for every advertiser j who is not allocated to any ad slot, 0k
gg
jk
g
jk CR
jjj  for all 
}...1{ Kk . 
 
The first condition is an incentive compatibility constraint, guaranteeing that each advertiser’s 
bid type and bid level are individually optimal. The second condition is a participation constraint, 
requiring that no advertiser gets negative profits when it wins an advertising slot. The third 
condition ensures efficient exclusion of advertisers from slots.  
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 Milgrom (2000, Thm. 3) proves that at least one equilibrium in pure strategies always 
exists in this auction. See Borgers, et al. (2007) for an adaptation of Milgrom’s proof in a similar 
setting.  
 We now consider how website knowledge of advertisers’ types affects advertisers’ 
equilibrium choice of bidding strategies. We begin with the strong assumption that the website 
has perfect knowledge of advertisers’ types, meaning it knows which bidders are brand 
advertisers and which bidders are direct response advertisers. We then consider what happens in 
the more realistic case of website uncertainty about bidders’ types.  
 
2.4. Bid Type Choice under Perfect Website Knowledge of Advertisers’ Types 
When the website knows each advertiser’s type, it can infer its equilibrium click-through rate, so 
the website sets E
i
 for all direct response advertisers and 
E
i  for all brand advertisers. 
 
Proposition 1: If the website has perfect knowledge of advertisers’ types, every advertiser is 
indifferent between entering the best possible CPM bid and the best possible CPC bid in a static 
game. 
Proof: See Appendix.  
 
 Proposition 1 states that, when the website knows advertisers’ types, the best possible 
CPM bid and the best possible CPC bid produce identical profits, so advertisers will have no 
incentive to switch between the two types of bid. This is because every CPM bid has a CPC 
equivalent that will produce an identical outcome and vice versa. However, when we make the 
model more realistic by introducing some uncertainty on the part of the website about 
advertisers’ types, this indifference result no longer holds and advertisers will have strict 
preferences over bid types.  
 
2.5. Bid Type Choice under Website Knowledge of Advertisers’ Types 
We assume the website believes advertiser i is a brand advertiser with probability ip . The 
website uses this belief to form its expectation about the bidder’s click through rate, 
15 
 
)1( ii
E
i pp .
7
  
Niipp ,...,1)(  is an N-vector describing website beliefs about each 
advertiser’s type. Imperfect website information requires that at least one element of p is strictly 
between zero and one for some advertiser i.  
 
Proposition 2: Any direct response advertiser whose type is not known with certainty by the 
website has a strictly dominant strategy to enter a CPM bid. Any brand advertiser whose type is 
not known with certainty by the website has a strictly dominant strategy to enter a CPC bid.  
Proof: See Appendix.  
 
Next we consider how the website’s revenue is affected by its uncertainty about advertisers’ 
types. 
 
Proposition 3. An equilibrium exists under imperfect website information that produces the same 
assignment of advertisers to slots as the equilibrium under perfect website information. 
Comparing the first equilibrium with the second, the website’s advertising revenues fall by 
)1(
))(1(
ii
i
pp
p
 for any brand advertiser i whose type is not known with certainty. Revenues 
received from direct response advertisers do not fall in comparison with the perfect information 
benchmark.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
 Imperfect website information about advertiser types opens the door to strategic bid 
reversals by both brand advertisers and direct response advertisers, but it only lowers website 
revenues (compared with the perfect information benchmark) received from brand advertisers. 
This is because the direct response advertisers actually pay more using CPC bidding under 
imperfect website information—the switch to CPM bidding makes them better off but does not 
lower their total cost compared to the perfect website information case.  The harm to website 
revenues associated with uncertainty and strategic bidding by brand advertisers is increasing in 
the degree of website uncertainty about advertisers’ types, at an increasing rate.  
 
                                                     
7
 This specific assumption is a useful simplification of the form the website’s belief could take, but the results below 
will go through under any prior formulation such that 1}{
E
i
pr  when i is a direct response advertiser and 
1}{
E
i
pr  when i is a brand advertiser. 
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3. Equilibrium Analysis in a Repeated Game 
Online advertising auctions are repeated frequently. Our analysis, to this point, relies on an 
assumption of private information about advertiser types and click-through rates. Given frequent 
repetitions of a static game, it may be the case that players can infer each other’s types. Private 
information may be revealed through equilibrium strategies. It is an open question whether the 
bidding reversal result of Proposition 2 would hold in a more realistic dynamic setting. It also 
may be that the website learns about each advertiser’s click-through rate over time, so a large 
amount of data on historical click-through rates could reduce website uncertainty about 
advertiser types. To investigate, we generalize the model beyond the assumed one-shot game to 
show that bidding against type can also occur in repeated games.  
 In section 3.1, we show that brand advertisers may still use bid reversals as an 
equilibrium strategy in a repeated game, under the assumption that the website uses only the 
prior period to form its expected click-through rate in the current period. This simplification is 
useful for setting up the result in section 3.2, which shows that allowing the website access to the 
full history of click-through rates still does not remove the possibility of equilibrium bid 
reversals.  
 
3.1. A Dynamic Hybrid Advertising Auction with Simple Website Expectations 
We add the following assumptions to our previous framework. We assume that the static game 
described in section 2 is played within each of t=1,…,T time periods. For simplicity, we assume 
the range of possible click-through rates does not change over time, but our analysis below is 
robust to modifications to this assumption.  
 Within a dynamic game, the website faces the problem that it must anticipate what each 
advertiser’s click-through rate will be prior to allocating advertisers to slots. It therefore still 
faces the possibility that advertisers may strategically deviate from anticipated click-through 
rates. We begin by assuming a simplistic structure for website beliefs about advertisers’ click-
through rates and generalize it substantially in section 3.2.  For now, we assume that the website 
anticipates advertiser i’s click-through rate in period t to be 1it
E
it , the realization of the 
advertiser’s click-through rate in the previous period.  
Each advertiser chooses T bid types (
iTi gg ,,1  ), T bids (
iTi g
iT
g
i bb ,,
1
1  ) and T click-
through rates (
iTi ,,1  ) to solve the profit maximization problem  
17 
 
                                                
T
t
g
it
E
it
g
ititikt
t
bg
i
itit
itg
ititit
bb
0
}{},{},{
),,(max   (6) 
where  is the discount factor and itg
itb is an (N-1)-vector of other advertisers’ bids in period t.  
 We characterize our notion of equilibrium in Definition 2.  
 
Definition 2: Based on a set of website expectations about advertisers’ click-through rates 
TtNi
E
it ,...,1,,...,1)( , a set of bids TtNi
g
it
itb ,...,1,,...,1)(  and a set of click-through rates TtNiit ,...,1,,...,1)(  is 
a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) if there is a sequence of orders of bidders such that 
for every advertiser i we have the following: 
1. The choice sequence of click-through rates (
iTi ,,1  ) and bids (
iTi g
iT
g
i bb ,,
1
1  ) maximize 
advertiser i’s total profits in equation (6). 
2. For every period t, if advertiser i wins slot k with bid 
itg
itb , then for every other position 
Kk ,...,1' , },,,{MAX ''
'
'
ititititit g
tik
g
ik t
g
tik
g
ik t
g
ik t
; 
3. For any advertiser i who wins slot k in period t, 0itgik t ; 
4. For any advertiser j who doesn’t win a slot in any period t, 0kt
gg
jkt
g
jkt CR
jtjtjt  for 
all Kk ,...,1 . 
 
The first condition ensures that advertiser choices maximize dynamic profits, rather than static 
profits. The other conditions are similar to definition 1, ensuring incentive compatibility, 
participation, efficient exclusion, and subgame perfection in each time period. We now make it 
clear how a brand advertiser can exploit the auction mechanism within the dynamic game. We 
first define the strategy the advertiser would follow and then show that it may be used in 
equilibrium.  
 
Definition 3: A Lattice Strategy is a repeated two-stage strategy profile in which an advertiser 
submits a CPM bid with a maximal click-through rate  in the first period, then enters an 
equivalent CPC bid with a minimal click-through rate  in the second period.  
 
The Lattice Strategy is essentially a bait-and-switch tactic: the advertiser sets a high click-
through rate to calibrate the website’s expectation in the next period. When the next period 
comes, it switches to a minimal click-through rate and uses the CPC bidding strategy to reduce 
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its advertising costs. To show this strategy may be played in equilibrium, we employ the One-
Stage Deviation Principle of Blackwell (1965), a method of testing whether a sequential strategy 
profile in a dynamic game is subgame perfect. This principle states that a multi-stage strategy is 
subgame perfect in a dynamic game if and only if no player has incentive to deviate from this 
strategy profile in exactly one stage. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) provide a detailed discussion. 
This substantially simplifies the process of showing a strategy is subgame perfect, since it is not 
necessary to rule out deviations in every single stage of the game.  
 
Proposition 4: A SPNE exists in which brand advertisers employ the Lattice Strategy under 
simple website expectations, and direct response advertisers enter their CPC bids from the static 
game.  
Proof: See Appendix.  
 
 When direct response advertisers enter CPC bids with maximal click-through rates, brand 
advertisers’ best strategy is to use the Lattice Strategy. Even if this does not change the 
equilibrium ranking among advertisers, it gives brand advertisers a cost advantage by allowing 
them to take advantage of the website’s backward-looking formation of click-through rate 
expectations. Note, however,  that direct response advertisers now bid according to type.  
 Next, we consider whether the Lattice Strategy is still profitable if the website employs 
more data to form expected click-through rates.  
 
3.2. A Dynamic Hybrid Advertising Auction with Sophisticated Website Expectations 
Sellers of online advertising typically say they form expectations about advertisement 
performance based on historical click-through rates. We now show that simplistic analysis of 
historical click-through rates, regardless of how much data they use, would not eliminate the 
profitability of the Lattice Strategy.  
 We consider a family of click-through rate expectation functions ),...,( 10 itit
E
it G , 
with the properties (i) 0
sit
tG  for all ),...,1,0( ts 0<s<t, (ii) tG  if and only if sit  
for at least one ),...,1,0( ts , and (iii) tG  if and only if sit  for at least one 
),...,1,0( ts .  This function nests intuitive formulations such as a simple average of historical 
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click-through rates 
t
s
sit
E
it t
1
1
, or a weighted average 
t
s
ssit
E
it
1
 with positive weights 
0s .  
 
Proposition 5. If the website sets ),,( 10 itit
E
it G  , a SPNE exists in which brand advertisers 
employ the Lattice Strategy, and direct response advertisers enter their CPC bids from the static 
game.  
Proof:  See Appendix.  
 
 We have shown that if the website uses some average or weighted average of prior click-
through rates, it cannot remove the profitability of the Lattice Strategy. Yet, if brand advertiser i 
is simply alternating between high and low click-through rates in every period as prescribed by 
the Lattice Strategy, the website could form its expectation using a non-averaging technique and 
predict the advertiser's click-through rate exactly in every period. However, there are more 
sophisticated extensions of the Lattice Strategy that the website would be unable to predict. For 
example, the advertiser could draw a random positive integer s from a distribution f(s) and only 
deviate to CPC bidding with minimal click-through rates after s periods, then draw another s, and 
repeat. Even if the website knew f(s), it could not perfectly predict the website's pattern of click-
through rates due to the inherent randomness of the strategy, leaving some periods in which the 
Lattice Strategy extension would be profitable. In addition, given that realized click-through 
rates will likely be noisy, it would be difficult for the website to know the true bounds of an 
advertiser’s click-through rate. The only way the website could completely remove the 
profitability of the Lattice Strategy is if its click-through rate expectations were based only on 
periods in which the advertiser used CPC bidding. This is one of the key implications of our 
analysis that we discuss in the next section. 
 
4. Managerial Implications 
Our analysis has produced several results that could influence websites’ and advertisers' business 
practices.   
 Our results imply that brand advertisers, rather than using a default CPM bidding 
strategy, ought to think carefully about which type of bid to enter. They may often be better off 
using a CPC bidding strategy while simultaneously discouraging clicks on their ads. They may 
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also profit from alternating high-click ads in conjunction with CPM bids in some periods 
interspersed with low-click ads purchased with CPC bids in other periods.  
 Our results imply that direct response advertisers might benefit from taking a CPM 
bidding strategy with a maximal click-through rate in one-off advertising auctions. However, 
they do not suggest that these firms should alternate high-click and low-click ads in repeated 
auction settings.  
 For advertising sellers such as websites, search engines, and other media, we have three 
implications. Most importantly, our results suggest that offering clients multiple bid types may 
backfire. While there may be non-negligible cognitive costs associated with either requiring 
direct response advertisers to bid on a per-impression basis, or requiring brand advertisers to bid 
on a per-click basis, these must be traded off against the potential revenue damage associated 
with strategic choice of bid types. If the advertising seller is not cognizant of the results 
presented in this paper, it could find the opposite of what it expects when it offers a hybrid 
advertising auction: namely, brand advertisers bidding on a per-click basis. Sites where direct 
response advertisers predominate (such as search engines) might find it optimal to exclude CPM 
bidding, and sites where brand advertisers abound (such as news sites) might find it best to 
exclude CPC bidding. This recommendation should appeal not only to sites currently offering the 
hybrid auction format, but also to sites that might consider doing so in the future.  
 Second, our analysis highlights how website uncertainty about advertisers’ types opens 
the door to strategic bid choices. The greater the website’s uncertainty, the more strategic 
bidding against type will harm website revenues. Websites using hybrid advertising auctions 
might consider instituting policies that induce advertisers to reveal their true types. For example, 
a website might offer an add-on service that would be valued differentially by brand advertisers 
and direct response advertisers and then use observations regarding which advertisers use that 
service to infer advertisers’ types. The website might also manually investigate advertisers to try 
to glean more information about their types. The website can then use any information it gains 
about advertisers’ types to set expected click-through rates.  
 Third, the profitability of the lattice strategy in the dynamic setting suggests that the 
website should be careful in choosing expected click-through rates. Advertisers’ potential use of 
this strategy suggests that if an advertiser’s click-through rate is observed to vary up and down, it 
may be desirable to use the lower bound of the observed click-through rates as the expected 
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click-through rate in future periods. When formulating expected click-through rates, another 
possibility would be to ignore a bidder’s observed click-through rates realized in periods when 
the bidder used CPM bids, though this might reduce the amount of data available for use in the 
expectation formation process.    
  
5. Discussion 
We have presented the first analysis of equilibrium bidding strategies in a hybrid advertising 
auction. We have shown that if the seller of advertising knows which bidders are direct response 
advertisers and which bidders are brand advertisers, it can make advertisers indifferent between 
CPM and CPC bidding. However, if the website is uncertain about the type of any advertiser, 
that advertiser will have the incentive to bid against type in a static game: brand advertisers will 
enter CPC bids and direct response advertisers will enter CPM bids. This bid reversal hurts the 
seller’s profits, and the harm increases in the level of uncertainty about bidder type. The strategic 
bid reversal result holds up for brand advertisers in a repeated game, but not for direct response 
advertisers. Our analysis is remarkably general compared with most of the literature: it does not 
rely on assumptions about the number of ad slots, bidders, or time periods; public information; a 
single type of advertiser; or fixed click-through rates.  
 Despite this generality, we have made several simplifying assumptions. Two assumptions 
in particular suggest directions for future research. The first assumption that might be relaxed is 
that, like other papers in this literature, we have analyzed a monopoly seller of advertising. 
Expanding the analysis to multiple websites could introduce elements of two-sided market 
competition. Advertisers might have a chance to choose among different websites. Also, 
websites might choose their policies based on the possibility of advertiser or consumer defection 
to competitors. In this paper, we have not considered that advertiser adoption of a website’s 
platforms could be a function of its business model. 
 A second dimension that might be profitably relaxed is in the direction of richer strategic 
interactions between advertisers. For example, we do not allow for the possibility of advertiser 
collusion, which may be sustainable under a small number of advertisers, a large number of time 
periods, and/or relatively flat distributions of slot-dependent click-through and impression rates. 
Another possibility would be to model the “bid jamming” argument of Ganchev et al. (2007), in 
which advertisers increase their bids without changing their positions in order to exhaust rivals’ 
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budgets faster without increasing their own advertising costs. These effects have been ignored by 
most of the theoretical literature, but may yield important new insights.  
 
 
Appendix.  Proofs of all Lemmas and Propositions. 
 
Lemma 1. If a direct response advertiser gets an ad slot in the static game, its weakly dominant 
strategy is to choose .  
Proof: When a direct response advertiser enters a CPC bid, its profit is kE
i
i
Diik
c
ik CrX , 
which is weakly increasing in 
i
 so long as E
ik
k
i
X
C
r , which must be true if the advertiser bid 
rationally and won the auction. If the D advertiser enters a CPM bid, the D advertiser’s profit is 
kDiik
m
ik CrX , which is strictly increasing in i . Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 2. If a brand advertiser gets an ad slot in the static game, its weakly dominant strategy is 
to choose . 
Proof: If a brand advertiser enters a CPC bid, its profit is kE
i
i
iBk
c
ik CrY , , which is strictly 
decreasing in 
i
. If it enters a CPM bid, its profit is kBik
m
ik CrY , which is not a function of 
i
. Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 1: If the website has perfect knowledge of advertisers’ types, every advertiser is 
indifferent between entering the best possible CPM bid and the best possible CPC bid in a static 
game. 
Proof: Let 
ib  be a vector describing the bids of the N-1 advertisers other than advertiser i. If 
advertiser i chooses CPC bid *c
ib , it must be the case that ),(maxarg
*
i
c
ii
c
i bbEb ; in other 
words, if it chooses any CPC bid, it will choose the best available CPC bid available. Denote i's 
equilibrium position given *c
ib  and ib  as k. Its profit is then k
c
ik
c
ik CR .  
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 We now prove that advertiser i has no incentive to submit a CPM bid by contradiction. 
Assume there exists a CPM bid *m
ib  yielding position 
'k  (which may be the same as position k) 
which can increase i's profit. Under this assumption, ''' , k
m
ki
m
ik
CR . Advertiser i could 
submit a CPC bid 
E
ik
m
ic
i
X
b
b
'
*
**  that wins position 'k and earns profit 
m
ik '
 since 1cm . 
However this produces a contradiction in the definition of ),(maxarg* i
c
ii
c
i bbEb . The proof 
that an advertiser entering a CPM bid has no incentive to switch to CPC bidding is symmetric. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2: Any direct response advertiser whose type is not known with certainty by the 
website has a strictly dominant strategy to enter a CPM bid. Any brand advertiser whose type is 
not known with certainty by the website has a strictly dominant strategy to enter a CPC bid.  
Proof: A direct response advertiser’s payoff when submitting a CPC bid is 
k
ii
ik
c
ik C
pp
R
)1(
. If it submits a CPM bid, it gets kik
m
ik CR . CPM bidding 
strictly dominates since 1
)1( ii pp
.  
 The opposite thing happens for brand advertisers. A B type bidder’s payoff when 
submitting a CPC bid is k
ii
ik
c
ik C
pp
R
)1(
, while it gets kik
m
ik CR  for submitting 
a CPM bid. Since 1
)1( ii pp
, the CPC bidding strategy is strictly dominant. Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 3. An equilibrium exists under imperfect website information that produces the same 
assignment of advertisers to slots as the equilibrium under perfect website information. 
Comparing the first equilibrium with the second, the website’s advertising revenues fall by 
)1(
))(1(
ii
i
pp
p
 for any brand advertiser i whose type is not known with certainty. Revenues 
received from direct response advertisers do not fall in comparison with the perfect information 
benchmark.  
24 
 
Proof: We start by first proving that bid reversals do not give any advertiser an incentive to 
deviate from the assignment of advertisers to slots found under perfect website information about 
advertiser types. Considering the equilibrium in pure strategies under perfect website 
information, assume that advertiser i gets position k with a CPM bid (or a CPC equivalent bid), 
with },,,{MAX
''
''
iiiii g
ik
g
ik
g
ik
g
ik
g
ik  for kk
'
 and 
ii gg
' . So advertiser i’s profit is 
kik
c
ik CR  and '' kikkik CRCR  for any slot 'k . Under imperfect website information 
about advertiser types, we know from proposition 2 that brand advertiser i will use its CPC bid 
equivalent 
))1((
*
*
iik
m
ic
i
ppX
b
b  . Given no change in rivals’ equivalent bids, advertiser i 
can certainly get slot k, and i's profits are highest in slot k because 
''
)1()1(
k
ii
ikk
ii
ik C
pp
RC
pp
R  since 1
)1( ii pp
. So advertiser i 
would not switch to any other slot 'k . The proof for a type D advertiser is symmetric. 
 To compare the website’s revenue in two cases, first we know under perfect website 
information about advertiser types, brand advertiser i in slot k pays 
kC . Under imperfect website 
information, it pays k
ii
C
pp )1(
, which is lower by a fraction of 
)1(
))(1(
ii
i
pp
p
. Under 
imperfect website information, the direct response advertiser in slot k pays the same amount as it 
does under perfect website information, 
kC . Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 4: A SPNE exists in which brand advertisers employ the Lattice Strategy under 
simple website expectations, and direct response advertisers enter their CPC bids from the static 
game.  
Proof: We start by considering the equilibrium in pure strategies of the static game under perfect 
website information about advertisers’ types (the setting analyzed in section 2.4). We assume 
that advertiser i gets position k with a CPM bid (or a CPC equivalent bid) 
*m
ib  in the static 
equilibrium. Since the Lattice Strategy is a two-stage strategy, then by the One-Stage Deviation 
Principle, we can prove it is a SPNE strategy if we can show that i has no incentive to deviate 
from it in either stage, given other advertisers’ actions. We will do this by first proving that 
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repeated interactions do not give any advertiser an incentive to deviate from the assignment of 
advertisers to slots found in the static game. Second, we prove that, for advertiser i, the Lattice 
Strategy strictly dominates other options in the first period (stage t-1). Finally, we show that it is 
also strictly dominant in the second period (t).  
 The advertising cost in position k in period t is  
        . and 1slot in  advertiser  thedenotes   where,
. and 1slot in  advertiser  thedenotes   where,
''
'''
*
*
mgki'b
cgki'bX
C
ti
m
ti
ti
c
ti
E
tik
kt
  
It can be shown that when brand advertisers employ the Lattice Strategy, 
ktC  is equal to the cost 
structure in the static game and does not vary over t. This is straightforward to see for direct 
response advertisers, who do not change their bids from the equilibrium in the static game. For 
brand advertiser i' in slot k' employing the Lattice Strategy, 
*
''
m
titk bC  for t in the set of periods 
that i' enters a CPM bid. For the set of periods that i' enters a CPC bid, 
*
''''
c
ti
E
tiktk bXC . Since 
E
ti '  by the Lattice Strategy and 
*
'''
c
tik
m
ti bXb  by the definition of CPC/CPM equivalence in 
section 2, we have shown that ktC  does not vary over t. It therefore follows that, for each direct 
response advertiser and for brand advertiser entering CPM bids, the assignment of advertisers to 
slots that was optimal in the static game remains optimal in every period of the repeated game in 
the proposed equilibrium. However, brand advertisers entering CPC bids get a cost advantage, so 
we must consider whether this induces them to optimally switch slots. We can rule this out by 
noting that when brand advertiser i gets slot k with a CPC bid, it gets 
kik
c
ikt CR  in period t. 
Since definition 1 gives us '' kikkik CRCR  for all k', it must be the case that 
'' kikkik CRCR  for all k', since 1. For Direct Response advertisers, from Lemma 1 
we know that DR advertisers always benefit from a higher click-through rate, so it is not optimal 
for DR advertisers to take the Lattice Strategy. As a result, DR advertisers always maximize their 
click-through rates. 
 We now show that the Lattice Strategy is strictly dominant for brand advertisers. In 
period t-1, i can vary its click-through rate or its bid type. Any 1it  with a CPM bid would 
leave i’s payoff in period t-1 unchanged, but would weakly decrease its payoff in period t. Since 
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1it
E
it , ktE
it
ik
c
ikt CR  is maximized at 
 
1it . The other possible deviation in period t-
1 is switching to a CPC bid and possibly also changing its click-through rate. Under the Lattice 
Strategy, 2it , so 
E
it 1  and i’s profits from a CPC bid in t-1 would be 
kt
it
ik
c
ikt CR
1
1
. Yet for any click-through rate 1it , 
c
ikt 1  is weakly less than i’s profits 
under a CPM bid, 
k tik
m
ik t CR1 , and 
c
ikt  would be strictly diminished, lowering total profits 
in equation (6). Therefore the Lattice Strategy is strictly preferred to any other in period t-1.  
In period t, i can again vary its click-through rate or its bid type. We have 
kt
it
ik
c
ikt CR , so any it  would reduce 
c
ik t
. If i switched to a CPM bid, its profit is 
ktik CR , strictly less than 
c
ik t
. So the Lattice Strategy is also strictly preferred in period t. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 5. If the website sets ),,( 10 itit
E
it G  , a SPNE exists in which brand advertisers 
employ the Lattice Strategy, and direct response advertisers enter their CPC bids from the static 
game.  
Proof:  Again we used the One-Stage Deviation Principle. The key point is that now, in period t, 
advertiser i gets profit k
itit
ik
c
ikt C
G
R
),,( 0 
. Since 0
1it
tG , the advertiser has a 
dominant strategy to maximize its click-through rate in period t-1 and minimize it in period t. 
The rest of the proof is parallel to that of Proposition 4, so it is omitted for brevity. Q.E.D. 
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